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With public opinion weighing heavily against panhandlers in gen-
eral and aggressive panhandling' in particular, elected officials face
the difficult task of enacting legislation which both satisfies their con-
stituencies and survives constitutional challenges. A sample of recent
public opinion indicates the public's patience with panhandlers is
steadily dwindling.2 Surprisingly, many peaceful panhandlers are
themselves in favor of proscriptions which outlaw threatening, intimi-
dating, or abusive behavior accompanying panhandling.3 Addition-
ally, it has been reported that somewhere between sixty-five and
1. UNITED STATES CONF. OF MAYORS, A STATUS RPT. ON HUNGER & HOMELESS-
NESS IN AMERICA'S CrrIEs: 1990 50-53 (1990) (discussing a clear trend of public intolerance
and sometimes hostility towards panhandlers, individuals perceived to be homeless, and
aggressive panhandling in particular which is accompanied by abusive or threatening
behavior).
2. Robert L. Gaskin, Taking Back the Streets; San Francisco, California's Ordinance
to Control the Homeless, NAT'L REV., Sept. 12, 1994, at 22 (reporting that the "Matrix"
program instituted by Mayor Frank Jordan was a direct result of the general public outcry
regarding the homeless and panhandlers in particular); Alexander Peters, Begging's the
Question in S.E Suit; Ex-Panhandler Challenging State Law's Constitutionality, THE RE-
CORDER, Apr. 25, 1991, at 1, 6 (citing a survey that found that 46% of nonresidents and
39% of residents had feared for their personal safety following confrontations with the
large number of panhandlers in San Francisco).
3. Matt Neufeld, Street Beggars Get Warning: Be Polite; Fliers Clarify 'Aggressive'
Panhandling, WASH. TIMEs, June 16, 1993, at B1. (Quoting a Georgetown panhandler in
response to the new ordinance banning "aggressive" panhandling, "If they're aggressive, I
think they should be locked up."); Morenike Efuntade, Panhandlers Warned in Leaflets;
New D.C. Law Bars Aggressive Behavior, Blocking Doorways, WASH. POST, June 16, 1993,
at C3 (quoting the belief of an anonymous Georgetown panhandler that some panhandlers
scare tourists and make it more difficult for the passive panhandlers to survive, "[t]his is a
good law."); Bob Whitby, Tampa Cracks Down on Panhandlers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1993, at 1 (paraphrasing the opinion of Jessie Hawthorne, a self-described panhan-
dler, that some street beggars ply their trade with the "purpose of hurting people and
taking something").
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eighty-five percent of typical urban homeless are alcoholic, mentally
impaired, addicted to drugs, or some combination of the three.4
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitu-
tionality of passive panhandling5 prohibitions, many jurisdictions with
such ordinances choose to forego enforcement since the prevailing
conclusion is that blanket bans on panhandling infringe upon an indi-
vidual's right to free speech.6 Several influential jurisdictions have
struck down anti-panhandling prohibitions as violative of an individ-
ual's First Amendment right to free speech.7 Thereafter, local legisla-
tors responded by drafting regulations which focus not on begging per
se, but on conduct accompanying aggressive panhandling-conduct
not considered inherent to the communication of the panhandler's
message. The proscriptions, known as anti-aggressive panhandling
statutes, have become extremely popular recently. Since 1977, gov-
ernmental entities in ten states and the District of Columbia have en-
acted aggressive panhandling statutes.8 The primary question raised
4. Elena Neuman, Attitudes Hardening Toward the Homeless; As Public Gets More
Fed Up, Cities Respond with Tough Laws, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2,1994, at A7. See also Neal
R. Pierce, Philly's Kinder, Gentler Center City, NAT'L J., Apr. 25, 1992, at 1015 (citing
similar statistics within Philadelphia).
5. Passive panhandling is commonly thought to include such solicitations as display-
ing a sign asking for financial assistance or the mere extension of one's hand (or cup)
accompanied by a request for alms. Ulmer v. Municipal Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445,447 (Ala-
meda County 1976); see also Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir.
1993).
6. Although 26 states currently have anti-panhandling laws, only two-Maryland and
Arizona-have recently made arrests for violations of their panhandling prohibitions.
Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Places: A Constitutional Approach to
Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REv. 285, 302, 303 n.101 (1993).
7. Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (The holding that
panhandling was protected speech was vacated by the original presiding judge on proce-
dural grounds in February, 1996. The vacating has no effect on existing law in the State of
California since the Blair court was merely applying judicial precedent. Rex Bossert, Anti-
Panhandling Law Can Be Enforced, S.F. DAILY J., Feb. 2, 1996, at 1); Loper, 999 F.2d at
704; C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c) (West 1995) (prohibiting "accost[ing] other persons in
any public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of begging or soliciting
alms"); S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 120-21 (1992) (prohibiting "harassment and hounding"
in the course of soliciting alms); HAw. REv. STAT. § 711-1101(1) (1985) (prohibiting "phys-
ical inconvenience or alarm" through physical obstruction of others while panhandling or
soliciting alms in public); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (1987) (forbidding
"aggressive panhandling"); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CHARTER & CODE OF ORDINANCES tit.
15, § 385.65 (1988) (forbidding the interference of either pedestrian or vehicular traffic);
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., MUN. CODE § 12-1-2-7 (1988) (prohibiting "aggressive[ ] begging");
ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-3006 (1991) (prohibiting the solicitation of
alms or panhandling by "accosting another"); BALTIMORE, MD., CrrY CODE, art. 19, § 249
(1994) (criminalizing aggressive panhandling); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE § 910-913
(1992) (forbidding interference with pedestrian or vehicular traffic); DALLAS, TEX., CITY
CODE § 31-35 (1991) (outlawing "solicitation by coercion" after a negative response has
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by aggressive panhandling is: to what extent can panhandling and its
accompanying conduct be constitutionally prohibited?
The recent spate of legislation designed to combat the intimidat-
ing and offensive conduct associated with aggressive panhandling will
have to survive three primary constitutional arguments in order to
avoid invalidation: (1) the assertion that panhandling is protected
speech under the First Amendment, (2) that "aggressive" panhandling
prohibitions are too vague to be understood by a person of average
intelligence and therefore violate due process, and (3) the notion that
"aggressive" panhandling prohibitions are content-based restrictions
which violate equal protection.
Part I of this Note discusses settled legal principles which hold
that blanket bans on passive panhandling are per se violative of the
First Amendment since they cannot be considered 'narrowly tailored'
in furtherance of their governmental objectives. Within this introduc-
tory framework, the remainder of this Note will evaluate the constitu-
tionality of legislation which purports to prohibit the aggressive
behavior often accompanying the solicitation of alms. In order to il-
lustrate the pitfalls that await the drafters of such legislation, two cur-
rent aggressive panhandling provisions will be tested under the three
relevant constitutional safeguards which exist to protect U.S. citizens
from laws which infringe upon the fundamental rights of the individ-
ual. Part II evaluates the constitutionality of aggressive panhandling
proscriptions under the O'Brien standard and against a legislative
backdrop which permits reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions on communications protected by the First Amendment. Part III
measures the chosen aggressive panhandling legislation against the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment while Part IV ap-
plies a similar analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Note concludes that legislators may
properly enact prohibitions which outlaw aggressive panhandling
within the parameters of the Constitution. This conclusion is unavoid-
able despite the existence of constitutional safeguards designed to
protect fundamental individual liberties.
I. Panhandling and the First Amendment
The First Amendment guarantee of free speech has been held ap-
plicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 State and lower federal courts have reached different
conclusions in applying First Amendment jurisprudence to anti-pan-
been given); TuLSA, OKLA., PENAL CODE § 1407 (1992) (forbidding stopping others for the
purpose of asking for money); and 22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 3311 (1993) (proscribing "aggres-
sive panhandling").
9. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
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handling laws.' ° Restrictions focusing solely on the panhandler's
speech go directly to the heart of the First Amendment. However, the
legislature can outlaw conduct which falls outside of communications
recognized by the First Amendment. If the mere act of panhandling
falls within the constitutionally protected definition of "speech," then
blanket bans on panhandling violate the First Amendment.
While not the focus of this Note nor the subject of most aggres-
sive panhandling prohibitions, it is worth noting that legislators can
outlaw panhandling that 'intimidates' or 'accosts' solely by way of ob-
scene or threatening language. Although obscene words and verbal
threats are a form of 'speech' in its purest form-communication fall-
ing within this category has never been protected under the First
Amendment.1' As such, this Note will focus on legislation prohibiting
the nonspeech aspects of aggressive panhandling.
The analysis begins with the concept of protected speech under
the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment. Maximum protec-
tion is accorded to communication which is characterized as "pure
speech,"12 "expressive conduct,"' 3 or "charitable solicitation,"' 4 while
a somewhat lesser degree of constitutional protection is afforded to
"commercial speech."' 5 Additionally, when the intent of legislation is
to regulate only the nonspeech portion of expressive conduct, inciden-
tal limitations on First Amendment rights may be justified.'
6
A finding that panhandling warrants full protection under the
First Amendment will require that any regulation of the panhandler's
speech in the traditionally public forums of streets and sidewalks17 be
narrowly tailored' 8 to achieve a compelling state interest. 19 In con-
10. Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Loper v. N.Y. City Police
Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(cases invalidating panhandling prohibitions as violative of the First Amendment); but cf.
Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990); City of Seattle v. Web-
ster, 115 Wash. 2d 635; Ulmer v. Municipal Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 448 (Alameda County
1976) (cases upholding panhandling proscriptions despite First Amendment challenges).
11. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("[F]ighting words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace" are not protected by the First Amendment because their "'slight social value as a
step to truth ... is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."). Id. at
572.
12. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
13. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974).
14. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 676 (1992);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
15. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
16. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
17. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,480 (1988) (observing that streets and sidewalks are
traditionally public fora).
18. The requirement that regulations be "narrowly tailored" serves as a limit upon the
methods chosen by the legislature to further the compelling interest: the restriction on
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trast to the compelling interest level of scrutiny, a conclusion that pan-
handling is commercial speech will result in a lower level of protection
from legislative regulation.2 °
Even assuming that panhandling constitutes protected speech,
some regulation of the accompanying conduct may still be allowed.
The O'Brien standard 2' permits restrictions on the nonspeech portion
of a panhandler's conduct where only slight limitations on the ability
to exercise First Amendment rights occur.2 A state may also enforce
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on speech or expressive
conduct as long as the regulation is content-neutral, narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest, and leaves open adequate
alternative channels of communication- 3
A. Blanket Bans on All Forms of Panhandling
Examining panhandling within the framework of the First
Amendment requires an evaluation of legislative bans on all forms of
panhandling, which would include the passive solicitation of alms.
The distinction between aggressive and passive panhandling is based
on the behavior accompanying the request for financial assistance.
Passive panhandling can generally be defined to encompass behavior
such as: asking for "spare change," sitting beside a sign that asks for
financial help, or the mere extension of an open hand. 4 Aggressive
panhandling can broadly be defined to include a request or demand
for money which is accompanied by threatening, intimidating, or men-
acing behavior.2 - Blanket bans which encompass passive panhandling
are of questionable constitutional validity since passive panhandling-
without any aggressive conduct-constitutes speech protected under
speech interests must not be substantially more intrusive than any other regulatory alterna-
tives that would equally accomplish the governmental objective. Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-802 (1989).
19. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 676 (1992);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). Protecting the public from "undue annoyance" has been recog-
nized as a "substantial" government interest. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Bet-
ter Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
20. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
21. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See infra note 80-83 and
accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Perry
Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980).
24. See supra note 5.
25. See, e.g., infra note 177-178 and accompanying text.
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the First Amendment.2 6 As with any other legislation which infringes
upon a fundamental right, the First Amendment requires that any reg-
ulation on protected speech be narrowly tailored to further a compel-
ling governmental interest.27  Government cannot regulate pure
speech when the speech restriction is based upon the speech's content
absent a compelling state interest.28 This principle finds its origin in
the first words of the Bill of Rights.29
1. Pure Speech
Communication characterized as "pure speech" is presupposed to
embody a message conveying the speaker's opinion on such weighty
matters as societal, economic, or political issues.30 It has been sug-
gested that panhandling itself is not pure speech because its objective
is the transfer of money, and speech is not an inherent facet of the
conduct as one can "beg" without speaking a single word.3' Were the
Supreme Court to determine that such societal, economic, or political
viewpoints were inextricably intertwined32 with the panhandler's re-
quest for alms, the panhandler's message would almost assuredly be
characterized at the very least as "charitable solicitation," which is a
lesser form of pure speech.3
Judicial interpretations, however, support the conclusion that the
mere act of panhandling falls short of characterization as pure
speech3M However, maximum protection under the First Amendment
may still be extended under a theory that the panhandler's message is
either expressive conduct or a charitable solicitation.
26. C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). But see Ulmer v.
Municipal Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Alameda County 1976).
27. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-802 (1989).
28. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980).
29. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech .. . ." U.S. CON T. amend. I, § 1.
30. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
31. Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding the
test for determining whether or not conduct possesses adequate elements of communica-
tion to merit analysis under the First Amendment is whether a particularized message was
present, and whether there was a great likelihood that those viewing the message would
understand it). See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
32. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 (holding that an ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door or on-street solicitation by charitable organizations was unconstitutionally
overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
33. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
34. Young, 903 F.2d at 153; Ulmer v. Municipal Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445,447 (Alameda
County 1976).
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2. Expressive Conduct
The test for determining whether or not particular conduct pos-
sesses sufficient elements of communication to warrant characteriza-
tion as protected speech was set forth in Spence v. Washington.35 In
Spence, the Court stated that conduct is accorded full protection
under the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment when there
is "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message ... , and in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it."
'36
The key question, then, is whether panhandling involves an intent
to convey a particularized message. Whereas the war protester in
Spence displayed a peace symbol taped to an upside-down United
States flag in order to convey his protest of United States actions in
Cambodia and the fatal shootings at Kent State University,37 panhan-
dlers engage in conduct designed primarily to solicit money for them-
selves. As the Second Circuit noted in Young v. New York Transit
Authority,38 "begging is not inseparably intertwined with a 'particular-
ized message'... most individuals who beg are not doing so to convey
any social or political message. Rather, they beg to collect money.
3 9
The Young court further noted that regardless of whether or not the
panhandler has the intent to communicate any particularized message,
there is no great likelihood that those viewing the conduct would un-
derstand the message as anything other than an attempt to solicit
alms.40
Although the court's reasoning in Young is very persuasive, a
strong case can be made that panhandling deserves maximum First
Amendment protection as expressive conduct. While the Young court
chose to characterize panhandling as conduct with the primary objec-
tive of obtaining money, 41 other commentators have observed that
panhandling is a method by which the disenfranchised members of
society choose to convey the reality of their plight.42 Two commenta-
tors argue that "[b]egging does considerably more than 'propose a
commercial transaction.' Like other charitable requests, begging ap-
peals to the listener's sense of compassion or social justice, rather than
to his economic self-interest. ' 43 Therefore, panhandling can be con-
35. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
36. Id. at 410-11.
37. Id at 405.
38. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
39. Id at 153.
40. Id at 153-54.
41. Id. at 153.
42. Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and
the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. Rav. 896, 908 (1991).
43. Id.
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strued as conveying the speaker's ideas about the social and political
environment as well as the deficient way in which the government
provides for the less fortunate citizens of this country. As the court in
Blair v. Shanahan" pointed out,
A request for alms clearly conveys information regarding the
speaker's plight. Panhandling gives the speaker an opportunity
to spread his views and ideas on, among other things, the way
our society treats its poor and disenfranchised. And in some
cases, a panhandler's request can change the way the listener
sees his or her relationship with and obligations to the poor.45
In this context, the mere act of panhandling could properly be consid-
ered expressive conduct within the judicial definition of that term.
Given the contrasting views of the aforementioned courts in two
of the most influential jurisdictions in the country,4 6 whether or not
panhandling warrants status as expressive conduct appears to be an
open question. Although the Supreme Court could plausibly rule
either way in deciding whether or not panhandling embodies sufficient
elements of communication to warrant classification as "expressive
conduct," it is highly unlikely that the Court would be willing to follow
the reasoning of the district court in Blair. When faced with the issue
of solicitation of alms by charities in public places, the Supreme Court
has consistently chosen to consider the issue under a charitable contri-
bution analysis rather than an expressive conduct analysis.47 Unless
the Court decides to make a distinction between soliciting funds for
oneself and soliciting for a charity, it is likely that the Supreme Court
would accept the conclusion reached in Young that a panhandler's
message is not expressive conduct within the definition set forth in
Spence v. Washington.
48
Unquestionably, the courts are in disagreement as to whether or
not panhandling falls within the First Amendment umbrella of "ex-
pressive conduct." While the panhandler may very well be attempting
to convey the message theorized by the Blair Court, perhaps a more
reasonable conclusion was reached in Young. The average person ap-
44. 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322-23 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (vacated on procedural grounds).
45. IM.
46. The Circuit Court of Appeals for New York in Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,
903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that panhandling is not protected speech); cf. the
opinion of the District Court for the Northern District of California in Blair v. Shanahan,
775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that panhandling is protected speech).
47. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (cases analyzing the issue
from a "charitable solicitation" perspective rather than an "expressive conduct" point of
view). Note that even as a charitable solicitation, panhandling would receive the full pro-
tection of the First Amendment.
48. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
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proached by a panhandler on a street or sidewalk presumably inter-
prets the panhandler's conduct to be a request for money-nothing
more and nothing less. A request for money is a message which has
never been recognized as a type of communication deserving maxi-
mum First Amendment protection.
While analyses under pure speech or expressive conduct theories
yield inconclusive results, panhandling may still be accorded status as
fully protected speech if it meets the criteria for charitable solicitation.
3. Charitable Solicitation
As first stated in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment49 and recently reaffirmed in International Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,5" charitable solicitation is entitled to
maximum protection under the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment. The rationale underlying this conclusion was discussed
by the Court in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund,5 which held that a nexus exists between charitable solicitations
and the dissemination of information about societal causes or the ad-
vocacy of political ideas.5" In order for face-to-face requests for funds
to fall within the definition of charitable solicitations, the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly required the solicitation and ac-
companying speech to be so intertwined as to presume that the speech
is inherent to the conduct.5 3 When confronted with the issue of
whether an ordinance regulating the solicitation of funds by a charita-
ble organization passed constitutional muster, the Schaumburg Court
stated that "[s]oliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to rea-
sonable regulation but... must be undertaken with due regard for the
reality that [charitable] solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particu-
lar causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social is-
sues."54 Additionally, the Court indicated that conduct warrants
characterization as a charitable solicitation when it concerns more
than just private economic interests; otherwise, such conduct risks
classification as "commercial -speech."55
Given the existing First Amendment jurisprudence related to
"charitable solicitation," it is likely that even "passive" panhandling
would fall outside of the stated criteria. Face-to-face solicitation for
personal financial assistance may be readily accomplished without the
49. 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
50. 505 U.S. 672, 676 (1992).
51. 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985).
52. Id- at 799.
53. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).
54. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
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need for any speech at all,56 let alone be possessed with the intent to
convey a political belief or a message related to societal interests. Ad-
ditionally, panhandling is conduct which is primarily (if not solely)
concerned with the private economic interests of the speaker.
This viewpoint, however, is not conclusive with regard to the pos-
sible classification of panhandling as charitable solicitation. As the
Blair court noted:
[C]haritable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door,
involve a variety of speech interests-communication of infor-
mation, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas,
and the advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of
the First Amendment. No distinction of constitutional dimen-
sion exists between soliciting funds for oneself and for
charities.
57
If panhandling is characterized as either pure speech, expressive
conduct, or charitable solicitation-all receiving full First Amendment
protection-a blanket ban on panhandling cannot survive a First
Amendment challenge. Such blanket prohibitions on these types of
speech are not narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling state inter-
est and cannot withstand First Amendment challenges.58 Although
protecting its citizens from undue annoyance has been recognized as a
substantial state interest,59 it falls short of the requisite compelling
state interest standard. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably be postu-
lated that the general appearance of panhandlers creates an unreason-
able environment of undue annoyance. A passerby can simply avoid
the alleged annoyance by walking away or ignoring the panhandler.
Any possible annoyance resulting from tolerating the mere existence
of panhandlers would certainly fall short of justifying an infringement
upon First Amendment liberties.
Perhaps even more dispositive is the extreme unlikelihood that a
court would conclude that any blanket ban could ever be narrowly
56. The consensus definition of the term "passive" panhandling given earlier, see supra
note 5, includes such conduct as extending a cup to a passerby or displaying a sign asking
for donations.
57. Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (quoting Village of
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632). See supra note 7.
58. It is difficult to conceive of a narrowly tailored blanket prohibition. While a state
may have a variety of "compelling interests" which would support some infringement upon
an individual's First Amendment right to speech (including such recognized objectives as
protecting citizens from undue annoyance, fear, fraud, or intimidation), the Supreme Court
would likely conclude that legislation could be drafted in a manner less intrusive upon an
individual's fundamental liberties than a "blanket ban." See Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
59. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636 (stating that recognized "substantial" gov-
ernment interests include "protecting the public from fraud, crime and undue
annoyance").
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tailored. As the Second Circuit has stated: "Even if the state were
considered to have a compelling interest in preventing the evils some-
times associated with panhandling, a statute that totally prohibits pan-
handling in all public places cannot be considered 'narrowly tailored'
to achieve that end. '6u
Despite the lack of consensus with regard to the proper First
Amendment classification of panhandling, all jurisdictions have ac-
corded panhandling the status of "commercial speech."
4. Commercial Speech
It has been suggested that panhandlers soliciting alms should be
treated no differently than a charitable organization soliciting finan-
cial funds as a group. This would necessarily qualify panhandling for
maximum protection under the First Amendment,61 although the
more common belief is that panhandling proposes a commercial trans-
action and is therefore properly characterized as "commercial
speech."'62
The Commercial Speech Doctrine was formulated by the
Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen63 and subsequently refined
under the rulings in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v.
Public Service Commission of New York, 64 and Board of Trustees of
the State University of New York v. Fox.65  Although commercial
speech receives less protection under the First Amendment than does
pure speech, expressive conduct, or charitable solicitation, 66 the Cen-
60. Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
61. Id at 705.
62. Commercial speech was defined by the Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); see, e.g., Board of
Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,473 (1989) (reaffirming the Court's
definition of commercial speech as that which does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 562 (1980) (noting that there is a common sense distinction between speech with inci-
dental commercial purposes and speech having its primary objective as proposing a com-
mercial transaction); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505,
1513 (1993) (noting that speech is characterizable as commercial speech when conduct "re-
late[s] solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience").
63. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that "the Constitution imposes no... restraint on
government as respects purely commercial [speech]," which essentially authorized the gov-
ernment to regulate commercial speech in any manner it deems necessary); Cf. Village of
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 n.7 ("[t]o the extent that any of the Court's past decisions...
hold or indicate that commercial speech is excluded from First Amendment protections,
those decisions, to that extent, are no longer good law.") Thus, the Court retreated from
its earlier decision that commercial speech was entitled to no First Amendment protection
whatsoever.
64. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
65. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
66. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tral Hudson Court developed the following four-part analysis for de-
termining the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations:
For commercial speech to come within that [First Amendment
protection], [1] it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 67
Under the fourth prong of this analysis, the Court does not require
that the manner of regulation be the least severe to accomplish the
desired end.68 Rather, there merely must be a reasonable "'fit' be-
tween the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends."69 In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,7° the Court
recently held that it is unnecessary to show that less intrusive infringe-
ments upon individual liberties may be available in order to uphold
such a restriction on commercial speech:
While we have rejected the "least-restrictive-means" test for
judging restrictions on commercial speech, so too have we re-
jected mere rational basis review. A regulation need not be
"absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end,"
but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alterna-
tives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a
relevant consideration in determining whether the "fit" between
ends and means is reasonable.7'
Accordingly, two inquiries must be answered in the affirmative
before the Court will uphold the constitutionality of a blanket ban on
panhandling under a commercial speech analysis. First, it must be de-
termined whether passive panhandling is an undue annoyance.
72
Given that passive panhandling is included in a blanket ban, the Court
is not likely to reach this conclusion since any passerby approached by
a passive and peaceful panhandler can walk away from this allegedly
"undue" annoyance. Second, the Court would have to find that a
blanket ban on panhandling bears a reasonable fit to the achievement
of the stated governmental interest. This is doubtful given the follow-
ing observation made by the Central Hudson Court:
We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress
commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related pol-
67. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 at 566.
68. Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. 469 at 480.
69. Id. (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
70. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
71. Id, at 1510 n.3.
72. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636 (noting that "undue annoyance" is a sub-
stantial governmental interest).
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icy. In those circumstances, a ban on speech could screen from
public view the underlying governmental policy. Indeed in re-
cent years this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commer-
cial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some way,
either because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.' 3
Based on the foregoing guidance, blanket bans on panhandling
could be held unconstitutional even when reviewed under the lenient
Commercial Speech Doctrine. This is true for several reasons. First,
there are numerous and less-intrusive alternatives available in order
to achieve the state's substantial interest in protecting the public from
undue annoyance. For example, the state can enact legislation limited
to barring the aggressive, intimidating, or abusive behavior which may
accompany a panhandler's solicitation of alms. Certainly this option
provides a significantly more reasonable fit between the legislative
means and ends of the state. Second, given the Court's stated reluc-
tance to uphold any type of blanket ban on commercial speech, a par-
ticularly persuasive justification for a complete suppression of
commercial speech would have to exist in order for the Court to alter
its current position on blanket bans. The ability of the passerby to
ignore, avoid, or walk away from a panhandler would seem to mitigate
the undue annoyance factor used by the state to justify its blanket ban.
Finally, panhandling is neither deceptive nor related to unlawful
activity7 4-two characteristics necessary for the Court to uphold the
constitutionality of a complete suppression of commercial speech.
Panhandling is not deceptive since the panhandler is affirmatively
making a plea for financial assistance based on the desperateness of
his or her situation. The panhandler intends for those solicited to un-
derstand that a "donation" is being sought for the panhandler's own
personal well-being. Additionally, neither charitable solicitation nor
charitable donation have been found to be unlawful conduct.
In light of the foregoing, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme
Court would uphold the constitutionality of a blanket ban on panhan-
dling even under a commercial speech analysis.
B. Blanket Bans: A Conclusion
The constitutionality of legislation purporting to ban all forms of
panhandling is highly suspect. If panhandling is accorded status as
either pure speech, expressive conduct, or charitable solicitation, it is
entitled to maximum protection under the First Amendment and any
73. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 (citing Virginia State Bd..of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 780 n.8 (1976) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring)) (emphasis added).
74. Note that in this context, "deceptive" speech refers to fraudulent or false advertis-
ing which is intended to defraud the public, rather than a panhandler's solicitation of alms
based on a false comment. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72.
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restriction must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state in-
terest.75 If the Court declines to confer maximum protection upon
panhandling under the First Amendment, the characterization of pan-
handling as commercial speech is a virtual certainty. Although com-
mercial speech is entitled to a lower level of protection under the First
Amendment, a blanket ban on panhandling is the most intrusive man-
ner in which a state could seek to protect the public from any alleg-
edly undue annoyance resulting from panhandling. While this aspect
of the blanket ban does not render it unconstitutional per se, the
Court has discouraged any kind of blanket ban on commercial speech
with some minor exceptions,76 none of which apply to the panhan-
dlers' speech. In light of this, a blanket ban on panhandling would be
struck down as a violation of the First Amendment.
Despite the inevitable conclusion that blanket bans are always
unconstitutional infringements on the First Amendment right to free
speech, legislative prohibitions limited to aggressive panhandling may
elicit a different conclusion. Legislation proscribing aggressive pan-
handling is designed to prohibit conduct which is unrelated to the
communicative aspects of the panhandler's message. Such prohibi-
tions-if drafted within constitutional parameters-might be a valid
exercise of legislative discretion.
II. Aggressive Panhandling and the First Amendment
Aggressive panhandling statutes are explicitly designed to ad-
dress the threats and intimidation that may accompany panhandling.
The legislative objective of such prohibitions is not to silence the pan-
handler or stifle the possible message, but rather to protect others
from abusive behavior or unreasonably annoying conduct. However,
the fact that prohibitions against aggressive panhandling are directed
at the panhandler's conduct rather than the purported message does
not eliminate the need to examine the legislation in question. .
In order to pass constitutional muster, regulations on threatening
or intimidating conduct associated with panhandling must meet the
judicial standards set forth in United States v. O'Brien,77 or must be
properly classifiable as reasonable time, place, or manner
restrictions.78
75. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
76. Central Hudson, 447 at 566 n.9 (indicating that the Court would be more receptive
to a blanket ban on commercial speech in the event that the expression was deceptive or
related to unlawful activity).
77. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
78. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); United States Postal
Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).
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A. The O'Brien Standard
Given that aggressive panhandling statutes attempt to regulate
the "nonspeech" elements of a panhandler's conduct,79 the standard
set forth in United States v. O'Brien8" will be controlling in any consti-
tutional challenge to this type of regulation. The O'Brien standard is
appropriate when a regulation restricts nonspeech elements of con-
duct but also imposes some limitations on First Amendment
freedoms:
When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inciden-
tal limitations on First Amendment freedoms.... [A] govern-
ment regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.8 '
In a recent application of the O'Brien standard, in Texas v. John-
son,' the Court emphasized the third aspect of the standard as the
primary difference between the O'Brien analysis and the criteria ap-
plied when evaluating reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
on free speech:
Although we have recognized that where "'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms," we have limited the applicability of
O'Brien's relatively lenient standard to those cases in which "the
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression."83
79. Note that many anti-aggressive panhandling prohibitions include "obscene or abu-
sive" language among the forbidden "conduct." See supra note 8. Although such restric-
tions clearly relate to a "speech" element of the panhandler's conduct, the Supreme Court
has long exempted such words from the category of "speech" the First Amendment strives
to protect. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (affirming the principle
that words tending to inflict injury by their very utterance, "fighting words," and words
constituting a breach of the peace were not protected under the First Amendment); Good-
ing v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (the punishment of "fighting words" by statute is
within the constitutional police power of the state); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (observing that legislation prohibiting obscenity was not inconsistent
with the First Amendment).
80. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
81. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
82. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
83. Id. at 407 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
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Based on a straightforward interpretation of the Johnson deci-
sion, the O'Brien standard is applied when the governmental interest
is not concerned with silencing the individual; otherwise, a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction analysis should be applied.
In order to illustrate an application of this doctrine, a typical ag-
gressive panhandling prohibition will be evaluated under the O'Brien
standard.
1. California Penal Code § 647(c)
Every person... (c) [w]ho accosts other persons in any public
place.., for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms is guilty of
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor.
84
The first prong of the O'Brien standard requires that the regula-
tion be within the constitutional power of the governmental entity.
Here, the authority of the California State Legislature to enact a crim-
inal regulation against intimidating, threatening, or abusive conduct
flows naturally from the state's police power.85
To meet the second prong of the O'Brien standard, the regulation
must further an important or substantial governmental interest. As
discussed previously, protecting the public from undue annoyance has
been characterized as a substantial government interest.8 6 California's
decision to prohibit panhandlers from intimidating or threatening the
public would appear to reasonably further a substantial governmental
interest.
The third prong requires that the regulation be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. Protecting the public from undue an-
noyance is unrelated to the suppression of expression. A panhandler
in California remains free to communicate any message so desired
without repercussions from law enforcement officials. California's
state interest lies in keeping its citizens free from intimidating and
threatening behavior-it is not the panhandler's "message" that is be-
ing regulated but his or her conduct. A panhandler is not prohibited
from soliciting alms, so long as the request is made without the accom-
panying aggressive behavior.
The final prong of the O'Brien standard requires the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms be no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Prohibitions against
intimidating, threatening, or abusive conduct that accompanies a pan-
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1995).
85. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (A
legislature may constitutionally prohibit persons from engaging in a myriad of antisocial
conduct, so long as the statutory language specifically indicates which behavior is
forbidden.).
86. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
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handler's solicitation of alms arguably go no further than necessary to
promote California's interest in protecting its citizens from undue an-
noyance. Such restrictions cover only the conduct that would fall
short of being classified as harassment or assault, and permits the pan-
handler to engage in any kind of constitutionally-protected speech.
While anti-social conduct is often proscribed within other statutory
prohibitions, the conduct of a panhandler does not need to be charac-
terized as harassment or assault before an environment of undue an-
noyance is created. As such, California is justified in enacting a
restriction on aggressive panhandling that still permits the maximum
exercise of First Amendment liberties. Given this analysis, prohibi-
tions on aggressive panhandling satisfy the O'Brien standard and are
therefore constitutional.
Closely related to the O'Brien standard is the criteria used for
evaluating whether a regulation warrants characterization as a reason-
able time, place, and manner restriction on speech.
B. Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Some restrictions on free speech will be upheld as reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions when the judicial criteria are sat-
isfiedY8 In order to survive a First Amendment challenge, a regula-
tion prohibiting aggressive conduct which may accompany
panhandling must: (1) be content-neutral-in other words, the regula-
tion cannot distinguish between prohibited and permitted conduct
based upon the content of the speech,"" (2) be narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest,89 and (3) leave alternate
channels of communication open.90 For purposes of analysis, a typical
aggressive panhandling prohibition will be evaluated against this
criteria.
1. Seattle Municipal Code § 12A.12.015
A person is guilty of pedestrian interference if... [that person]
intentionally: ... aggressively begs.91
87. "Time, place, and manner restrictions are not subject to strict scrutiny and are
sustainable if they are content neutral, designed to serve a substantial governmental inter-
est, and do not unreasonably limit alternative means of communication." FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 244 (1990) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
88. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
89. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 691 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
90. Id.
91. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (1987).
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First, it must be determined whether or not the statute is content-
neutral. The statutory definition of the phrase "aggressively begs" is
to "beg with intent to intimidate another person into giving money or
goods."92 It is immediately apparent that prohibiting "the intent to
intimidate another person into giving money or goods" during the
course of soliciting funds is content neutral. In fact, this typical ag-
gressive panhandling prohibition seeks to restrict only the conduct of
the panhandler and makes no effort to regulate or stifle the panhan-
dler's actual speech. Under this ordinance, a panhandler is free to
involve the listener in a discussion of politics, economics, societal ills,
or passively solicit funds without ever engaging in the forbidden con-
duct. There is no speech which in and of itself will trigger liability
under the statute. In contrast, conduct intended to "intimidate an-
other person into giving money or goods" during the course of solicit-
ing funds will subject the violator to criminal liability regardless of the
accompanying speech. As such, the prohibition is content-neutral.
Secondly, the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest. Protecting the public from undue annoy-
ance has been explicitly recognized as an important governmental
interest.93 Prohibiting only undesirable conduct associated with the
solicitation of alms furthers Seattle's important interest in protecting
the city's citizens from undue annoyance without infringing upon any
recognized fundamental liberties.94 A statute could not be more nar-
rowly tailored than one that forbids only specified aggressive conduct
while permitting the speaker to engage in virtually unlimited dis-
course, regardless of content. Hence, this ban on aggressive panhan-
dling meets the requirement that it be narrowly tailored to serve a
recognized governmental interest.
Finally, the statute must leave alternative channels of communi-
cation open. Under the Seattle statute, the panhandler's actual
speech is not regulated. Ample alternate channels of communication
are open-the panhandler can engage in any kind of speech as long as
no intent to intimidate accompanies the communication. If a Seattle
panhandler does not engage in any of the legislatively proscribed con-
duct, the content of the panhandler's message alone can never be the
basis for violating the aggressive panhandling statute.
Aggressive panhandling prohibitions withstand constitutional
challenges under the First Amendment. However, restrictions on in-
timidating or threatening behavior which may accompany the panhan-
92. Id
93. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
94. Note that there is no recognized fundamental right to harass, intimidate, threaten,
or abuse another person in a public forum. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111
(1969).
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dler's solicitation of alms must also survive due process and equal
protection challenges in order to be constitutionally valid.
IM. Aggressive Panhandling and Due Process
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall... deprive
any jerson of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw.
The conclusion that blanket bans on panhandling are unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment removes such prohibitions from
our analysis. However, prohibitions limited to aggressive panhandling
seem to pass constitutional muster under the First Amendment. This
is merely the first of three hurdles which aggressive panhandling re-
strictions must clear in order to satisfy judicial scrutiny. The second
obstacle requires aggressive panhandling statutes to be consistent with
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To survive a
due process challenge, such legislation must not be unreasonably
vague.96
A. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine involves two distinct criteria
with which aggressive panhandling statutes must comport. First, the
prohibition must be drafted in such a way that a panhandler of ordi-
nary intelligence would be able to understand what type of conduct is
prohibited. Such an understanding amounts to sufficient notice.97
Secondly, the statutory language must not be worded in such a man-
ner that permits arbitrary or discriminatory application by law en-
forcement officials.98 In Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Court
succinctly stated this well-settled doctrine:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague
laws offend several important values .... [W]e insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportu-
nity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accord-
ingly.... [I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who
apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis.
9'
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 (1983).
97. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
98. Id. at 109.
99. Id. at 108-09.
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The Supreme Court has not explicitly described how statutory
language must be worded in order to avoid being characterized as
vague. However, two general guidelines exist. First, if statutory lan-
guage is susceptible to more than one possible interpretation from the
perspective of a person of ordinary intelligence, the prohibition would
be vague and indefinite as to what conduct is proscribed and the pro-
scription is unconstitutionally vague."°
Secondly, the Court has indicated the most important safeguard
of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine "is not actual notice, but...
[rather] the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guide-
lines to govern law enforcement."' 0' A statute clearly proscribing
specific and particular conduct removes any undue subjectivity on the
part of law enforcement officials in determining whether or not to
charge a person with a violation.
Of great significance to the drafters of aggressive panhandling
statutes, the Court has made clear that a facial challenge to a criminal
statute may be successful despite the possibility that a conceivable ap-
plication may be valid.10 2 An analogous illustration of the Court's ap-
plication of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine is found in Coates v. City
of Cincinnati.0 3 Coates involved a facial challenge to a state criminal
statute. The Ohio State statute made it unlawful for "three or more
persons to assemble... on any of the sidewalks... and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by."'1° In finding
the statute facially unconstitutional, the Court observed:
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus,
the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person
to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible nor-
mative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of con-
duct is specified at all. As a result, "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.'
10 5
In determining the vagueness or clarity of statutory language, the
reviewing court generally relies upon the stated statutory definition,0 6
100. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964) (holding that a Washington State stat-
ute requiring teachers to take an oath swearing allegiance to the government of the United
States and exhibiting reverence for law and order was unconstitutionally vague).
101. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
102. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-59 n.8 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
("[legislation] should not be held unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is vague in
all of its possible applications").
103. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
104. Id. at 611 n.1 (quoting CincINNATi, OHIO, CODE § 901-L6 (1956)).
105. it. at 614 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
106. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wash. 2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1990) (utilizing
the included statutory definitions of "aggressively beg" and "obstructing pedestrian or ve-
hicular traffic" for purposes of evaluating the vagueness of the language prohibiting the
conduct).
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or upon the stated legislative intent accompanying the drafting of the
statute.10 7 Failure of the statute to define its terms will usually force a
court to review a commonly accepted dictionary as the prevailing au-
thority.108 With this background in place, two typical aggressive pan-
handling statutes will be analyzed for consistency with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. California Penal Code § 647(c)
California Penal Code § 647(c) 10 9 contains the following
provision:
Every person ... (c) [w]ho accosts other persons in any public
place... for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms is guilty of
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor.
10
In applying the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, it is first necessary
to determine whether any statutory terms are susceptible to more
than one interpretation by a person of ordinary intelligence."' As the
United States Supreme Court observed in Baggett v. Bullitt," 2 if statu-
tory language is susceptible to more than one possible meaning, the
prohibition is vague and indefinite as to what specific conduct is pro-
hibited and is unconstitutional." 3 The constitutionality of California
Penal Code § 647(c) depends upon the interpretation of the term "ac-
cost." Initially, a California superior court concluded that "if 'accost'
were to have two possible meanings, the statute would be vague and
107. See Ulmer v. Municipal Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Alameda County 1976); with re-
spect to CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c), The Ulmer Court noted that:
This section is drafted to meet the problem of controlling panhandling by describ-
ing specific acts. It is aimed at the conduct of the individual who goes about the
streets accosting others for handouts. It is framed in this manner in order to ex-
clude from one ambit of the law the blind or crippled person who merely sits or
stands by the wayside, the Salvation Army worker who solicits funds for charity
on the streets at Christmas time and others whose charitable appeals may well be
left to local control.
127 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (citing transcripts of relevant legislative discussions relating to the
purpose of the statute).
108. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 111 n.16 (using Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary to define the statutory term, "diversion"); State v. Starr & Combs, 113 P.2d 356, 358
(Ariz. 1941) (using Webster's Dictionary to define the statutory term, "loiter").
109. Note that this statute has been constitutionally evaluated with differing results by a
Court of Appeal of California in Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1976) (holding that "begging"
is not protected speech under the First Amendment and that the word "accost" is not
unconstitutionally vague), and a federal district court in Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp.
1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that "begging" constitutes protected speech and the statute
only bans "accost[ing]" for the purpose of soliciting alms, while other "accost[ing]" is law-
ful) (vacated on procedural grounds).
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1995).
111. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
112. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
113. Id at 367.
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indefinite as to what conduct it prohibits and therefore unconstitu-
tional."' 14 The superior court observed that available dictionary ref-
erences yielded multiple definitions for the term "accost," one of
which rendered the prohibition in question unconstitutional for
criminalizing protected conduct." 5 However, the reviewing appellate
court reversed the lower court's ruling and held that the statute was
not unconstitutionally vague." 6 The reviewing appellate court elected
to base its conclusion on transcripts of the legislative discussions.'
1 7
Although there is no judicial requirement that the reviewing
court look only to the definitions contained within the statute, or to
definitions available within commonly available dictionaries, the rea-
soning of the Ulmer court is in direct contrast with the Void for
Vagueness Doctrine. The approach taken by the Ulmer Court implies
that it is more reasonable for a person of ordinary intelligence to re-
view transcripts of the enacting legislature rather than to research the
definition of statutory language within commonly available dictiona-
ries. Such reasoning is tenuous at best, and ludicrous at worst. A per-
son of ordinary intelligence desiring to inform himself or herself as to
what conduct is prohibited by California Penal Code § 647(c) is likely
to encounter differing interpretations of the crucial term, "accost."
Rather than turning to legislative transcripts, a person of ordinary in-
telligence is likely to pursue the strategy often used by the United
States Supreme Court," 8 namely opening a dictionary to look up the
word.
A survey of two commonly available dictionaries resulted in the
following definitions of "accost": (1) "to approach and speak to often
in a challenging or aggressive way,""19 and (2) "to approach, especially
with a greeting, question, or remark.' °2 0 Armed with these two plau-
sible and well-supported interpretations, a panhandler of ordinary in-
telligence may realize that the term "accost" refers to an approach in a
challenging or aggressive manner, and may refrain from such behavior
114. As discussed by the reviewing court in Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 445 (citing Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964)).
115. Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 448. One common interpretation of "accost" defines it as
"to approach, especially with a greeting, question, or remark." RANDOM HOUSE WEB-
STER'S CONCISE DICrIONARY 5 (1st ed. 1993). Note that approaching a person with a
greeting or question is constitutionally protected conduct under the First Amendment free
speech guarantee, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972), and may not
be prohibited merely because the purpose of the approach is to solicit alms. Such an inter-
pretation would lead to a result that is constitutionally indistinguishable from a "blanket
ban" on panhandling.
116. Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
117. It.
118. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 111 n.16.
119. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 8 (5th ed. 1981).
120. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S CONCISE DICTIONARY, supra note 115.
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as the prohibition intended. Were this the only plausible definition of
"accost," the prohibition would be constitutional on its face since per-
sons of ordinary intelligence would not necessarily have to guess as to
which conduct is prohibited.'2 ' However, a panhandler who has the
misfortune of relying upon the second of these two definitions will be
forced to avoid engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. This is
disturbing in the sense that following one of the possible definitions
for the term "accost" results in the chilling of conduct which is pro-
tected by the First Amendment-namely, approaching another with a
greeting, question, or remark with the purpose of soliciting alms.
Such prohibitions are viewed with particular disapproval by reviewing
courts."'
Based upon an application of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine,
California Penal Code § 647(c) is unconstitutional on its face and one
is forced to conclude that the reasoning of the California appellate
court in Ulmer is extremely suspect and would not withstand further
judicial review by the United States Supreme Court. Since the term
"accost" is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it facil-
itates arbitrary and discriminatory application by law enforcement of-
ficials. Such statutory language is unlikely to survive further judicial
review.
This is not to suggest that all aggressive panhandling prohibitions
are unconstitutional per se, but rather to illustrate just how crucial the
drafting of legislation is with respect to the Due Process Clause.
While it is highly doubtful the California statute (or any other simi-
larly-constructed statute) would survive judicial scrutiny at the United
States Supreme Court level, the Seattle ordinance would likely receive
judicial approval since its aggressive panhandling prohibition is
facially valid.
2. Seattle Municipal Code § 12A.12.015
A person is guilty of pedestrian interference [a misdemeanor] if
... [that person] intentionally: ... aggressively begs."
To meet the first criteria of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, the
Seattle ordinance must provide sufficient notice to people of ordinary
intelligence. The ordinance contains the following crucial language:
"The following definitions apply in this section:... 'aggressively begs'
means to beg with intent to intimidate another person into giving
121. Note also that there are no First Amendment concerns, since this statute specifi-
cally prohibits behavior (rather than "speech" or "expressive conduct")-a regulation that
has been recognized as within the constitutional authority of the government.
122. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287
(1961).
123. SEATILE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (1987).
Winter 19961 AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING LEGISLATION
money or goods."' 24 The city council purported to define the relevant
statutory language and the definition of the term "intimidate" is
clearly crucial for purposes of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine. Were
a person of ordinary intelligence to seek guidance as to the term "in-
timidate," available dictionary interpretations provide the following
definitions: (1) "to make timid or fearful; especially to compel or de-
ter by or as if by threats,"'" and (2) "to make timid; [to] fill with fear,
... to force into or deter from some action by inducing fear."'
126
Given these consistent definitions, it is highly unlikely that a per-
son of ordinary intelligence would have to guess what conduct is pro-
hibited by the statute. Even if a panhandler of ordinary intelligence
were unable to determine the meaning of "intimidate" based on com-
mon everyday experiences of life, the dictionary definition is not sus-
ceptible to multiple interpretations. Intimidate has only one meaning:
to intentionally make fearful. Thus, it is doubtful that such an argu-
ment would persuade a reviewing court that the statute is void for
vagueness.
The next criteria to be met under the Void for Vagueness Doc-
trine is whether there are adequate guidelines to govern enforcement
of the statute. Although law enforcement officials cannot avoid mak-
ing some subjective determinations with regard to violations of statu-
torily proscribed behavior,127 a statute which clearly sets forth the
forbidden conduct in commonly understood terms inherently safe-
guards against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
12
Based upon existing Void for Vagueness jurisprudence, the sec-
ond prong of the doctrine is satisfied if the statute's violation is based
upon relatively objective standards. Given the commonly accepted
definition of "intimidate" used in Seattle's ordinance, a law enforce-
ment officer has explicit standards upon which to apply the aggressive
panhandling prohibition to specific circumstances. Not only must an
offender be panhandling, the panhandler must also be acting in a man-
ner designed to purposely fill the solicitee with fear, and to compel or
force the desired contribution.
This requires little if any subjective interpretations of conduct.
The panhandler violates this statute only if he or she "intimidates" a
potential solicitee while attempting to obtain money or goods. The
minimal subjectivity necessary in making this determination is well
within the permissible range of judgment entrusted to law enforce-
124. Id (emphasis added).
125. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY, supra note 119, at 605.
126. RANDOM HousE WEBSTER'S CONCISE DiCTnONARY, supra note 115, at 349.
127. "As always, enforcement requires the exercise of some degree of police judg-
ment." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114. Where the ordinance "delineates its reach in words of
common understanding," some degree of police judgment is permissible. Id at 112.
128. ld
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ment officials. Both the requisite unlawful intent and the accompany-
ing proscribed conduct must occur before the ordinance is violated.
Seattle's clear legislative standard is distinguishable from the more
questionable and subjective standards created by such terms as "an-
noying '129 or "accosting.'
3 0
Seattle Municipal Code § 12A.12.015 therefore passes judicial
scrutiny under the Void for Vagueness Doctrine.131 As such, this
properly-worded aggressive panhandling prohibition survives a facial
constitutional challenge and is consistent with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is well within the ability and
authority of a government to prohibit aggressive panhandling. The
only drafting requirements are that: (1) the proscribed conduct be
clearly and explicitly stated so as to provide sufficient notice, and (2)
the prohibition not be susceptible to arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement.
Although blanket bans on panhandling cannot survive a constitu-
tional challenge under the First Amendment, prohibitions on aggres-
sive panhandling are within the ambit of legislative prerogatives under
the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment and the Due Pro-
cess Clause. With this in mind, the only remaining constitutional chal-
lenge to the validity of aggressive panhandling prohibitions lies within
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. Aggressive Panhandling and Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides: "No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' 32 As Justice Stone stated within his
seminal United States v. Carolene Products Co.13 3 footnote, there are
two categories of civil liberties cases in which the Court will review
the challenged legislation with strict scrutiny: 34 (1) when legislation
129. The vagueness of the statutory term "annoying" was the basis upon which the
Court in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), struck down a Cincinnati, Ohio
loitering prohibition.
130. The statutory language contained within the California aggressive panhandling
statute; see supra notes 109-122 and accompanying text for discussion of California Penal
Code § 647(c).
131. A similar conclusion was reached by the court in City of Seattle v. Webster, 115
Wash. 2d 635 (Wash. 1990) (deciding that S.M.C. § 12A.12.015 survived judicial scrutiny
under the Void for Vagueness Doctrine).
132. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
133. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
134. Note that "strict scrutiny" requires that legislation be "narrowly drawn" to further
a "compelling state interest." See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677 (1992).
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differentiates between persons in their ability to exercise any right
based upon some suspect classification, and (2) when legislation differ-
entiates between individuals as to their ability to exercise any funda-
mental right.135 The rationale for this exacting judicial scrutiny in the
former instance is the inability of discrete and insular minorities to
effectuate change within the political system. 136 In other words, cer-
tain minorities lack the political clout necessary to ensure that their
individual liberties are not infringed upon by the ruling majority.
1 3 7
As such, the Court is fulfilling its primary function of guarding against
governmental infringement upon fundamental individual liberties.
A. Indigents Are Not a Suspect Class
Although arguments to the contrary are frequently made, indi-
gent members of American society have never been recognized as a
suspect class' 38 for purposes of equal protection analysis. 139 A persua-
sive argument can be made that indigence should be accorded pro-
tected status on the basis of the suspect trait of poverty, which
essentially relegates class members to the status as a discrete and insu-
lar minority. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to
acknowledge the nation's poor as a class deserving the same judicial
135. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
136. Id,
137. Id.
138. The Supreme Court has determined that the following "discrete and insular"
groups be accorded status as "classes" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause:
(1) race and national origin (see, eg., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944)
(setting forth the standard of judicial review for individuals classified based upon race and
announcing that racial classifications, "suspect" per se, must be examined with the most
"rigid scrutiny")); (2) alienage (see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (classi-
fications based upon alienage are "suspect")); (3) illegitimacy (see, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968) (legislation classifying children based upon the marital status of the
parents is subject to intermediate review-it must be "substantially related to an important
government interest")); and (4) gender (see, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(legislation which classifies persons on the basis of gender must be examined with interme-
diate scrutiny)).
All other legislation which "classifies" persons differently in terms of treatment under
the law in the broad area of economics or social welfare is reviewed under the "rational
basis test," which is extremely deferential to the legislature. Under this level of judicial
review, the legislation will be upheld if the law rationally relates to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. See, eg., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (holding that access to
the bankruptcy courts could be denied to those persons unable to afford the $50 filing fee
where a rational justification exists).
139. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (declaring that classi-
fications drawn along economic lines "are traditionally disfavored"; however, stopping
short of according "suspect" status to indigents). See also City of Seattle v. Webster, 115
Wash. 2d 635, 647 (Wash. 1990) (taking judicial notice of the fact that no judicial precedent
exists for characterizing indigence as a suspect class).
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protection as recognized suspect classes. 4 ° Historically, the Court has
treated wealth classifications' 4' in the same manner as any other non-
suspect classification not implicating the exercise of fundamental
rights."42 In these cases, the legislation in question is merely subjected
to a rational basis review. In the absence of a judicial determination
that indigence is a suspect class, any successful equal protection chal-
lenge to aggressive panhandling statutes must establish that the regu-
lation differentiates between persons in their ability to exercise a
fundamental constitutional right.
B. Discriminatory Treatment in the Exercise of a Fundamental Right
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
exercise of a fundamental right may not be based upon an individual's
wealth."43 In the words of the Court, "[f]reedom of speech..., which
[is] protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Con-
gress, [is] among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state
action."'" Given this precedent, if an aggressive panhandling statute
implicates a fundamental constitutional right, the Court will examine
that legislation under the strict scrutiny level of review. 4 This is sig-
nificant given the fact that legislation challenged under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and subjected to strict scrutiny is rarely upheld.
146
1. Panhandling as Protected Commercial Speech
As the initial constitutional inquiry in this Note demonstrated,
prohibitions on aggressive panhandling unquestionably implicate First
140. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
141. Generally defined to include any legislation which burdens the poor as a class to a
greater extent than other individuals, see, e.g., JOHN E. NOWACK & DONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONsrrruTiONAL LAw § 14.25 (4th ed. 1991).
142. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (receiving social security income
is not a fundamental right); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (entitlement to Aid
for Families with Dependent Children is not a fundamental right). See also United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (applying the rational
basis level of review to legislation where classifications of poor people were burdened in
their access to the judicial process, but where no fundamental right is involved).
143. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,355 (1963) (holding that where a criminal de-
fendant is not appointed counsel in the first appeal as of right, there has been an impermis-
sible discrimination between the wealthy and the indigent); Harper, 383 U.S. at 666
(conditioning the right to vote upon the payment of any fee or tax violates the Equal
Protection Clause); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971) (conditioning access to
marital dissolution procedures on the ability to pay judicial fees is unconstitutional discrim-
ination against the indigent).
144. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
146. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,208 (1992) ("[iut is the rare case in which we have
held that a law survives strict scrutiny").
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Amendment guarantees to free speech. 147 Although no successful
equal protection challenge to aggressive panhandling legislation has
been made under the First Amendment, legislation need only impli-
cate an individual's ability to exercise a First Amendment right in or-
der to qualify for strict scrutiny review by the Court.
2. The Content Neutrality Requirement
Although the judicial standard for determining whether or not
legislation is constitutional was initially identical under both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, 48 the Court has often deviated
from the strict scrutiny approach in equal protection cases. 149 The
leading equal protection case involving the First Amendment but not
a suspect class is Carey v. Brown.150 In Carey, the Court stated,
"[w]hen government regulation discriminates among speech-related
activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates
that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state inter-
ests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be
carefully scrutinized.' 15 1 As will be shown, Carey is the controlling
case for an equal protection challenge to an aggressive panhandling
prohibition.
Eight years prior to the decision in Carey, the Court decided Po-
lice Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 52 a similar equal protection
"picketing" case. In both cases, the challenged legislation made a dis-
tinction between legal and illegal picketing based on the subject mat-
ter of the picketing activity. The Illinois statute in Carey generally
prohibited all picketing of a residence unless the dispute was labor-
related. 53 The Court held the legislation to be unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause, stating that "the Illinois statute discrimi-
nates between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of
the... communication."'
54
The Court faced a similar issue in Mosley. 55 Similar to the chal-
lenged legislation in Carey, the Chicago ordinance in Mosley prohib-
ited all picketing within a certain distance from a school unless the
147. See supra Part I, which concludes that at a minimum, panhandling can be classified
as "commercial speech."
148. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
149. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972) (both cases utilizing an "intermediate" level of judicial review).
150. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
151. Id at 461-62 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99, 101) (emphasis added).
152. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
153. Carey, 447 U.S. at 457.
154. Id. at 460.
155. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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dispute was labor-related. 156 In striking down the ordinance under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated, "above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent." 5 7 Applying the First Amendment specifically to the Chicago
ordinance, the Court held that "discrimination among pickets is based
on the content of their expression. Therefore, under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, [the ordinance] may not stand." 58
It is well-settled that legislation limiting an individual's right to
free speech must be content-neutral.159 In its discussion of an equal
protection. challenge involving the First Amendment, the Carey Court
declared that a content-based restriction on fundamental First
Amendment liberties may be a valid exercise of government police
power in limited circumstances: "[T]hough we might agree that cer-
tain state interests may be so compelling that where no adequate alter-
natives exist a content-based distinction-if narrowly drawn-would
be a permissible way of furthering those objectives .... this is not such
a case."' 60 While the initial approach taken by the Carey Court in
analyzing this equal protection issue appears to suggest an intermedi-
ate level of review,'1 6 1 the Carey majority clearly requires that legisla-
tion infringing upon the exercise of fundamental First Amendment
rights must survive strict scrutiny in order to pass constitutional mus-
ter under the Equal Protection Clause.162
Despite this conflict within the Court's analysis, an equal protec-
tion analysis of the panhandling provision must nonetheless answer
the following two questions: (1) whether aggressive panhandling
prohibitions distinguish between lawful and unlawful speech-related
conduct based upon the content of the communication, and (2) if such
legislation makes a content-based distinction, is the prohibition none-
theless narrowly drawn so as to further a sufficiently compelling state
interest? It will be instructive to apply the foregoing principles to rep-
resentative aggressive panhandling prohibitions. California Penal
Code section 647(c) and Seattle Municipal Code section 12A.12.015,
selected earlier for purposes of applying the Void for Vagueness Doc-
trine under the Due Process Clause, will also best serve our equal pro-
tection analysis.
156. Id. at 92.
157. Id. at 95; see also Street v. N.Y., 394 U.S. 576, 591 (1976); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
158. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102.
159. Id. at 95; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
160. Carey, 447 U.S. at 465 (emphasis added); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
481 (1988).
161. Id. at 461-62 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99, 101).
162. Id.
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a. California Penal Code § 647(c)
Every person... (c) [w]ho accosts other persons in any public
place... for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms is guilty of
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor.
163
As discussed previously, "accosts" is an ambiguous term which
could reasonably be interpreted as meaning either: (1) "to approach
and speak to, often in a challenging or aggressive way,"" 6 or (2) "to
approach, especially with a greeting, question, or remark." 16 5 Earlier
analysis demonstrated that this ambiguity was a fatal defect for pur-
poses of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 66 However, for purposes of
equal protection analysis, the flaw lies not within the statutory mean-
ing of the term "accosts," but rather within the differentiation be-
tween lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of the
communication.
The application of the California statute could result in two out-
comes. Regardless of which definition is controlling, an indigent per-
son who "accosts" another person for the purpose of asking for
directions or the time of day would be engaging in lawful behavior. In
direct contrast to that scenario, a student who finds herself twenty-five
cents short for public transportation and "accosts" a passerby for a
quarter would be guilty of violating the statute. In the former scena-
rio, the act of accosting is lawful since the purpose was not to solicit
alms. In the latter scenario, an identical act of accosting would be
illegal based solely on the content of the person's speech-a funda-
mentally protected constitutional right.
These illustrations show that California Penal Code section
647(c) improperly differentiates between lawful and unlawful activi-
ties based upon the content of the communication. 167 In the words of
the Court in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley16 8 regarding the
unconstitutionality of a picketing ordinance, "the discrimination... is
based on the content of [the] expression. Therefore, under the Equal
Protection Clause, it may not stand.'
69
Although California Penal Code section 647(c) facially violates
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Carey v. Brown170 recog-
163. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c) (West 1995).
164. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 119.
165. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S CONCISE DICnONARY, supra note 115.
166. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
167. See also Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (reaching a
similar conclusion under an Equal Protection Clause analysis given different facts). See
supra note 7.
168. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
169. IM at 102.
170. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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nized that certain state interests may be so compelling that a narrowly
drawn, content-based distinction may be valid where no other ade-
quate alternatives exist to further those interests.17' For example, the
Court has found that states have a substantial interest in protecting
their citizens from undue annoyance, 172 but that this governmental ob-
jective falls short of being a compelling interest required under strict
scrutiny. Additionally, the allegedly compelling state interests such as
protecting persons from threatening, intimidating, or abusive behavior
are more than adequately provided for by alternative prohibitions
which do not burden individuals in their ability to exercise the funda-
mental constitutional right of free speech. In the words of one district
court, "a plethora of content neutral statutes with which the popula-
tion at large may be protected from threatening conduct" are cur-
rently available to law enforcement agencies. 173
As the analysis of this Note has demonstrated, California Penal
Code section 647(c)-which criminalizes aggressive panhandling-is a
content-based statute distinguishing between lawful and unlawful be-
havior. While this determination raises a strong presumption of un-
constitutionality, the statute would nevertheless survive review if a
sufficiently compelling state interest were furthered by the statute and
no other adequate alternatives for accomplishing that governmental
objective are available. However, California Penal Code section
647(c) fails to satisfy strict scrutiny examination for two reasons. First,
protecting its citizens from the undue annoyance that often results
from an encounter with an aggressive panhandler fails to warrant
characterization as a compelling state interest. 74 Second, even if such
a state interest was found compelling enough to justify an infringe-
ment upon a person's exercise of a fundamental First Amendment
right, 75 the prohibition falls short of the requirement that no other
adequate alternatives be available. 176
The foregoing analysis is not meant to suggest that all aggressive
panhandling prohibitions violate the Equal Protection Clause. On the
contrary, the previous discussion only serves to illustrate the difficult
constitutional pitfalls facing the drafters of such legislation. As the
following analysis of the Seattle ordinance will demonstrate, a prop-
171. Id at 465; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
172. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980)
(noting that "undue annoyance" is a substantial governmental interest rather than a com-
pelling governmental interest).
173. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324. A partial listing includes the following statutes: CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 211 (robbery), 240 (assault), 242 (battery), 415(1) (challenging to a fight),
415(2) (disturbing another by a loud noise), 415(3) (use of offensive words), and 647(f)
(willful and malicious obstruction of thoroughfares and public places) (West 1995).
174. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636.
175. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980).
176. Id.
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erly-drafted, content-neutral aggressive panhandling prohibition can
exist in constitutional harmony with the Equal Protection Clause.
b. Seattle Municipal Code § 12A.12.015
A person is guilty of pedestrian interference [a misdemeanor] if
... [that person] aggressively begs.'
77
The term "aggressively begs" is defined by the statute as panhan-
dling "with intent to intimidate another person into giving money or
goods."'1 78  Such language is not readily subject to differing
interpretations.
The distinction between the Seattle ordinance and the California
statute is apparent. Whereas California attempted to prohibit only
certain acts of accosting having the purpose of soliciting alms, the
drafters of Seattle's prohibition designed the ordinance to criminalize
only panhandling intended to intimidate the solicitee into parting with
money or goods. The distinction between these respective prohibi-
tions is subtle but constitutionally significant under an equal protec-
tion analysis. As demonstrated previously, the California statute
distinguishes between lawful and unlawful accosting based upon the
content of the accompanying communication, which violates the
Equal Protection Clause. In contrast, the Seattle ordinance distin-
guishes between lawful and unlawful panhandling not on the content
of the panhandler's communication, but rather on the related conduct
accompanying the solicitation of alms.
The Seattle ordinance is content-neutral and does not burden an
individual's ability to exercise any fundamental First Amendment
rights. Neither intimidating conduct nor threatening speech is a rec-
ognized form of communication protected under the free speech guar-
antees of the First Amendment. 179 In Seattle, all panhandlers who
beg with the intent to intimidate others into surrendering money or
goods are treated equally without any reference to the content of their
speech. Each is guilty of violating the ordinance since the intent was
to intimidate another into making a donation.
C. Aggressive Panhandling and Equal Protection: A Conclusion
The constitutionality of aggressive panhandling legislation de-
pends largely on the construction and interpretation of the prohibition
when challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. Content-based
legislation which differentiates between lawful and unlawful conduct
based on the content of the communication violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The lone exception to this principle arises when a state
177. SEATrLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (1987).
178. li
179. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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interest is sufficiently compelling and no other adequate alternative
measures will further that interest as well as a content-based
restriction.
California Penal Code section 647(c) is an example of constitu-
tionally deficient legislation. Seattle Municipal Code section
12A.12.015, on the other hand, is an example of a content-neutral ag-
gressive panhandling prohibition which does not differentiate between
lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of the communi-
cation. While the difference in statutory language between valid and
unconstitutional governmental enactments may be extremely subtle, it
is only the carefully-drafted aggressive panhandling legislation that
will survive judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Conclusion
Evidence of the general public's frustration with aggressive pan-
handlers has never been more prevalent. This frustration has fueled
the public's expectations that legislators will take some action to ban
this activity.
180
Current proscriptions on aggressive panhandling have replaced
former blanket bans on panhandling.18 1 Although blanket bans on
panhandling are likely to be declared constitutionally invalid under
the First Amendment, similar prohibitions on aggressive panhandling
should survive scrutiny. In contrast to the minimal First Amendment
obstacles to aggressive panhandling prohibitions, efforts to draft con-
stitutionally valid legislation under the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses are fraught with pitfalls which are not easily avoided.
The difference between constitutionality and unconstitutionality can
depend on the interpretation of a single ambiguous word, or upon
whether the law purports to prohibit only conduct and not speech.
Unfortunately for the nation's indigents, legislators can learn the
skill of drafting a constitutional law prohibiting "aggressive" panhan-
dling. Given the resources currently devoted to crafting this type of
legislation, it would be a welcome surprise if legislators spent an equal
amount of time, money, and effort solving the ills which necessitate
panhandling in the first place.
180. UNITED STATES CoNF. OF MAYORS, A STATJS RPr. ON HUNGER & HOMELESS-
NESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1990 50-53 (1990); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
